Given (deterministic) ciphers E and E that can encipher messages of l and n bits, respectively, we construct a cipher E * = XLS[E, E] that can encipher messages of l + s bits for any s < n. Enciphering such a string will take one call to E and two calls to E. We prove that E * is a strong pseudorandom permutation as long as E and E are. Our construction works even in the tweakable and VIL (variable-input-length) settings. It makes use of a multipermutation (a pair of orthogonal Latin squares), a combinatorial object not previously used to get a provablesecurity result.
Introduction
Domain extension. Consider a cryptographic scheme with a message space M = l∈L {0, 1} l for some set L of permissible message lengths. The scheme can handle any message of l ∈ L bits but it can't handle messages of l * ∈ L bits. Often the set of permissible message lengths L is what worked out well for the scheme's designers-it made the scheme simple, natural, or amenable to analysis-but it might not be ideal for the scheme's users who, all other things being equal, might prefer a scheme that works across arbitrary-length messages. To address this issue, one may wish to extend the scheme to handle more message lengths. Examples are extending CBC encryption using ciphertext stealing [21] and extending a pseudorandom function F with message space ({0, 1} n ) + by appropriately padding the message and calling F . Our work is about extending the domain of a cipher. When we speak of a cipher in this paper we mean a deterministic map E: K × M → M where M = l∈L {0, 1}
l and E K (·) = E(K, ·) is a length-preserving permutation. Such an object is also called an enciphering scheme, a pseudorandom permutation, an arbitrary-input-length blockcipher, or a deterministic cipher / encryption scheme. Our goal is to extend a cipher E: K × M → M with permissible message lengths L to a cipher E * : K * × M * → M * with an enlarged set L * ⊇ L of permissible message lengths. Being an extension of E, what E * does on a string of length l ∈ L and key K, K must be identical to what E would do on key K. Note that padding-based methods will not work: even if there is a point in the message space of E that one can pad a plaintext to, padding M to M * and then applying E would be length-increasing, and so not a cipher. Unlike signatures, MACs, pseudorandom functions, and semantically secure encryption, there is no obvious way to extend a cipher's domain.
Our contribution. We show how, with the help of an n-bit blockcipher E, to extend a cipher's set of permissible message lengths from L ⊆ [n .. ∞) to L * = L + [0 .. n − 1] = { + i | ∈ L and i ∈ [0 .. n − 1]}. In other words, we enlarge the message space from M to M * = M || {0, 1} <n where M ⊆ {0, 1} ≥n .
We call our construction XLS (eXtension by Latin Squares). Its overhead is two blockcipher calls, eight xor instructions, and two one-bit rotations. This is the work beyond enciphering (or deciphering) a single l-bit string that is needed to encipher (or decipher) an l + s bit one, where s ∈ [1 .. n − 1]. If the message is in the original domain there is no overhead beyond determining this. As an example, if E = E is an n-bit blockcipher then it will take three blockcipher calls to encipher a 2n − 1 bit string.
The XLS method is described in Figure 1 . For a message M already in the domain of E, just apply it. Otherwise, suppose that M has length l + s where l ∈ L and s ∈ [1 .. n − 1]. To encipher M : apply the blockcipher E to the last full n-bit block of M ; mix together the last 2s-bits; flip the immediately preceding bit; encipher under E the first l bits; mix together the last 2s-bits; flip the immediately preceding bit; then apply E to the last full n-bit block. Our recommended instantiation of the mixing step uses three xors and a single one-bit circular rotation.
We prove that XLS works. More specifically, if E is secure in the sense of a strong pseudorandom permutation (a strong PRP) [17] then E * inherits this property. This assumes that the blockcipher E is likewise a strong PRP. The result holds even in the variable-input-length (VIL) setting [3] : if E is VIL-secure then so is E * . See Theorem 3. It also holds in the tweakable-enciphering-scheme setting [16] : if E is tweakable then E * inherits this. See Section 8. If one makes the weaker assumption that E and E are ordinary (not necessarily strong) PRPs, then one can conclude that E * is a PRP. See Section 9.
While XLS is relatively simple, it is surprisingly delicate. We show that natural alternative ways of mixing do not work. We show that omitting the bit flip does not work. And attempting to get by without any mixing-say by enciphering the last n bits, the first l bits, then the last n bits-doesn't work even if one demands that the "overlap" in what is enciphered is n/2 bits: there is an attack of complexity 2 n/4 . All that said, we develop sufficient conditions on the mixing function that are enough to guarantee security, and we provide a mixing function based on multipermutations (also called orthogonal Latin squares [7] ). Though conceptually elegant, implementing multipermutations in this setting is slightly complicated, so we provide an alternate mixing function that approximates multipermutations via bit rotations. This comes at the (insignificant) cost of a slightly larger constant in the security reduction. XLS is the first mode of operation to employ multipermutations or approximate multipermutations to yield a provable-security guarantee. Indeed, such mixing functions may prove to be useful in further provable-security contexts.
We comment that we cannot handle messages of length less than n bits (the blocklength of the blockcipher that we use)-for example, we don't know how to encipher a 32-bit string using AES (in an efficient way and with a known and desirable security bound). This is a long open problem [6, 12] .
Related work. There are several known methods for turning a blockcipher with message space M = {0, 1} n into a cipher with some message space {0, 1}
≥n . Halevi does this in his EME * and TET constructions [12, 13] ; Fluhrer and McGrew do it (without a provable-security guarantee) with XCB [20] ; Wang, Feng, and Wu do it in HCTR [29] ; and Chakraborty and Sarkar do it in HCH [9] . All of these constructions are somewhat complex, and their methods for dealing with "inconvenient-length" strings are non-generic. Constructions of ciphers from n-bit blockciphers that result in a message space like ({0, 1} n ) + are offered by Zheng, Matsumoto, and Imai [30] , Naor and
Reingold [22] , Halevi and Rogaway [14, 15] , Patel, Ramzan, and Sundaram [24] , and Chakraborty and Sarkar [8] . One can even view Luby and Rackoff [17] in this light. Anderson and Biham [2] and Lucks [18, 19] make a wide-blocksize cipher out of a stream cipher and a hash function, and Schroeppel provides a cipher [27] that works on an arbitrary message space de novo.
When E = E is an n-bit blockcipher, the XLS construction solves the elastic blockcipher problem of Cook, Yung, and Keromytis [10, 11] , where one wants to extend a blockcipher from n bits to [n .. 2n − 1] bits. The Cook et. al solution is heuristic-there is no proof of security-but with XLS we have, for example, an "elastic AES" that provably preserves the security of AES.
When a cipher like CMC or EME [14, 15] plays the role of E in XLS, one gets a cipher with efficiency comparable to that of a mode like EME * [12] . Bellare and Rogaway first defined VIL ciphers [3] and built one (although it is not secure as a strong PRP). An and Bellare [1] offer the viewpoint that cryptographic constructions are often aimed at adjusting the domain of a primitive. This viewpoint is implicit in our work.
Applications. While primarily interested in the "theoretical" question of how to accomplish domain extension for ciphers, arbitrary-input-length enciphering is a problem with many applications. A well-known application is disk-sector encryption, the problem being addressed by the IEEE Security in Storage Work Group P1619. Another application is saving bandwidth in network protocols: if one has a 53-byte payload to be enciphered, and no IV or sequence number to do it, the best that can be done without increasing the size of the datagram is to encipher this 53-byte string. A related application is the security-retrofitting of legacy communications protocols, where there is a mandated and immutable allocation of bytes in a datagram, this value not necessarily a multiple of, say, 16 bytes. Another application is in a database setting where it should be manifest when two confidential database records are identical, these records having arbitrary length that should not be changed, but nothing else about the records should be leaked. Arbitrary-length enciphering enables bandwidth-efficient use of the encode-then-encipher paradigm of Bellare and Rogaway [4] , where one gets authenticity by enciphering strings encoded with redundancy and semantic security by enciphering strings that rarely collide.
Preliminaries
Basics and notation. For strings X, Y ∈ {0, 1} * , we use X || Y or X Y to denote concatenation.
We write
The complement of a bit b is flip(b). For a set C and element X we write C ∪ ← X for C ← C ∪ {X}. We require that for any set of bit strings S ⊆ {0, 1} * , if X ∈ S then {0, 1} |X| ⊆ S.
A cipher is a map E: K × M → M where K is a nonempty set, M ⊆ {0, 1} * is a nonempty set, and E K (·) = E(K, ·) is a length-preserving permutation. The set K is called the key space and the set M is called the message space. We can view the message space as ∪ l∈L {0, 1} l where
Let D be the cipher with the same signature as E and defined
A blockcipher is a cipher with message space M = {0, 1} n for some n ≥ 1 (the blocksize). For M ⊆ {0, 1} * let Perm(M) be the set of all length-preserving permutations on M. By selecting K = Perm(M) we have a cipher for which a uniformly chosen permutation on {0, 1} l is selected for each l ∈ L. Let Func(M) be the set of all length-preserving functions on M. Write Perm( ) and Func( ) for Perm({0, 1} ) and Func({0, 1} ), respectively. Let S ⊆ {0, 1} ≥1 . Then define S 2 = {XY | X, Y ∈ S ∧ |X| = |Y |}. Let f : S 2 → S 2 be a lengthpreserving function. We define the left projection of f as the function f L : S 2 → S where f L (X) is equal to the first |X|/2 bits of f (X). We define the right projection of f as the function f R : S 2 → S where f R (X) is equal to the last |X|/2 bits of f (X). Of course
When we say "Replace the last bits of M , Last, by F (Last)" we mean (1) parse M into X || Last where |X| = |M | − and |Last| = ; (2) let Z be F (Last); and (3) replace M by X || Z. We define the semantics of similar uses of "Replace . . ." in the natural way.
The notation "XY Z ← M of lengths x, y, z" for any string M with |M | = x + y + z means parse M into three strings of length x, y, and z and assign these values to X, Y , and Z, respectively. The notation is extended to the case of parsing M into two halves in the natural way.
Finally, an involution is a permutation g which is its own inverse: g(g(x)) = x.
Security notions. When an adversary A is run with an oracle O we let A O ⇒ 1 denote the event that A outputs the bit 1. Let E: K × M → M be a cipher. Then we define the following advantages for an adversary A:
where the probabilities are over the choice of K or choice of π (resp. ρ, σ) and the coins used by A. The first experiment represents distinguishing E and its inverse from a random length-preserving permutation and its inverse and the second experiment represents distinguishing E and its inverse from two random length-preserving functions. In both settings, we demand that the adversary A, given oracles f, g, does not repeat any query, does not ask g(Y ) after receiving Y in response to some query f (X), and does not ask f (X) after receiving X in response to some query g(Y ). Such forbidden queries are termed pointless.
While the above formalization allows variable input length (VIL) adversaries, we can also restrict adversaries to only query messages of a single length. We call such adversaries fixed input length (FIL) adversaries.
Informally, a cipher is called a "strong pseudorandom permutation" if no reasonable adversary A can distinguish the enciphering and deciphering functions, randomly keyed, from a randomly selected permutation and its inverse: Adv ±prp E (A) is small. Our theorems make concrete statements about this and so we will not have to formalize "reasonable" or "small." Resources we pay attention to are the adversary's maximum running time (which, by convention, includes the length of the program); the number of queries it asks; and the lengths of the queries. For any cipher E with inverse D, define Time E (µ) = max{T key , T E , T D } where T key is the maximum time required to generate a key L for the scheme, T E is the maximum time to run E L on a message of at most µ bits, and T D is the maximum time to run D L on a ciphertext of at most µ bits.
The XLS Construction
Fix a blocksize n. Let E: K E × M → M be a cipher with M ⊆ {0, 1} ≥n and let E:
n be a blockcipher. Finally, define a length-preserving permutation mix: S 2 → S 2 where Figure 1 for the definition.
Enciphering a message M with E * = XLS[mix, E, E] is straightforward. If M ∈ M, then simply apply E. Otherwise, apply E to the last full n-bit block of M and replace those bits with the result. Then 'mix together' the last 2s bits, again replacing the appropriate bits with the resulting mixture. Flip bit |M | − 2s, which is the first bit from the right not affected by mix. Apply E to as many bits as possible, starting from the left. Finally, just repeat the first three steps in reverse order. Deciphering is equally simple, and in fact, if one implements mix with an involution, as we suggest, then the inverse of E * is just
Why, intuitively, should XLS work? "Working" entails that each output bit strongly depends on each input bit. Since E presumably already does a good job of this we need only worry about mixing in the "leftover" s bits for M / ∈ M. We mix in these bits utilizing the mixing function mix. But since mix will be a simple combinatorial object-it is unkeyed and will have no "cryptographic" property-we need to "protect" its input with the blockcipher. The "symmetrizing" of the protocol-repeating the blockcipher call and the mixing step in the reverse order so that lines 03 → 09 are identical to lines 09 → 03-helps achieve strong PRP-security: each input bit must strongly depend on each output bit, as queries can be made in the forward or backward direction. Finally, the bit-flipping step is just a symmetry-breaking technique to ensure that different-length messages are treated differently.
If mix does a "good" job of mixing, then XLS will in fact be secure, as we prove in Section 6. But what is the meaning of "good," and how do we make a mixing function that is simultaneously good, efficient, and easy to implement? We now turn towards answering these questions.
The Mixing Function
We now look at several possible ways of implementing mix, to build intuition on what properties are needed for the security of XLS. In the end we formally define, quantitatively, the sufficient condition of interest. For ease of exposition we will often silently parse the input to mix into its two 
halves, i.e., mix(AB) means that A || B ∈ S 2 and that |A| = |B|. Also we interchangeably write mix(AB) and mix(A, B), which are equivalent.
A naive approach. Let's start with a natural construction that, perhaps surprisingly, does not lead to a secure construction. Suppose we define mixWrong by saying that mixWrong(AB) = A ⊕ B || B for equal-length A, B: the mixing function xors the right half of the input into the left half, outputting the result and the original right half. Clearly mixWrong is a length-preserving permutation. Furthermore, it might seem sufficient for XLS because it will mix the "leftover" bits into those handled by E. But this intuition is flawed: E * = XLS[mixWrong, E, E] is easily distinguished from a length-preserving permutation on M * . An adversary can simply query 0 n || 0 n−1 and 1 n || 0 n−1 . As one can easily verify, both E * (0 n || 0 n−1 ) and E * (1 n || 0 n−1 ) will have output with the last n−1 bits equal to 0 n−1 . This would be true of a random permutation with probability at most 1/2 n−1 , and so the adversary's advantage is close to one. In fact mixWrong does not do a good job of mixing: the right half of the output is only a function of the right half of the input. One can try various fixes, but ultimately it appears that using just xors is inherently inadequate.
Using orthogonal latin squares. The failure above suggests that what is needed is a mixing function with symmetry, in the sense that both the left and right halves of the output are dependent on both the left and right halves of the input. To achieve such a goal we can turn to the classical combinatorial objects known as a pair of orthogonal Latin squares [7] , also called a multipermutation [26] . This is a permutation mix:
, and mix R (·, C) are all permutations, where mix L and mix R denote the projection of mix onto its first and second component. Let us describe a concrete realization. Fix a finite field F 2 s for each s and view each s-bit string as an element of this field. Then we can build a mixing function mix1 by saying that
for equal-length strings A and B (we will assume the length to be at least 2). Here addition and multiplication are over F 2 s and 2 = 0 s−2 10 = x and 3 = 0 s−2 11 = x + 1. Addition is bitwise xor and multiplication by 2, which we also denote dbl, can be implemented by a shift and a conditional xor. The mixing function mix1 has several nice properties. First, it is a permutation and, in fact, an involution (meaning mix = mix −1 ). Moreover, for any C ∈ {0, 1} s we have that mix1 L (C, ·),
We show later that, when used in XLS, mixing function mix1 leads to a secure construction. Moreover, it is fast and relatively simple. But implementing it in XLS requires a table of constants corresponding to irreducible polynomials, one for each s ≤ n − 1. As it turns out, we can do better.
The simplified mixing function. We now simplify the mixing function mix1. Let rol(X) represent left circular bit-rotation, that is, for any string X of length s let rol(
where A and B are equal-length strings. See Figure 2 . Notice the similarity with mix1: we replaced multiplication by two with a left circular rotation. The bit rotation "approximates" a proper multiplication, eliminating, in an implementation, the conditional xor and the table of constants. As before, mix2 is an involution.
Quantifying the quality of mixing functions. We now formalize the properties of a mixing function that are needed in the proof of XLS.
Definition 1 Fix a set S ⊆ {0, 1}
≥1 , let mix: S 2 → S 2 be a length-preserving permutation, and let
We say that mix is an (s)-good mixing function if, for all s such that {0, 1} s ⊆ S,
s , and The best one can hope for is a 2 −s -good mixing function. In fact mix1 is such a function, while the mix2 function is just a factor of two off.
Lemma 1
The mixing function mix1 is a 2 −s -good mixing function. The mixing function mix2 is a 2 −s+1 -good mixing function.
, and mix1 R (·, C) are all permutations, the first half of the lemma is clear.
That mix2 meets parts 1 and 2 of the definition is clear. For the third part, we have that
and so we bound the number of values R such that C ⊕ rol(B) = R ⊕ rol(R). Let C = C ⊕ rol(B), which is a constant. Then we have that
. . .
There only exists a string R that satisfies the above equalities if
If there exists a solution, then pick a value for R [1] . That choice and the equations above combine to specify R[2], . . . , R[s]. This means that there are at most two possible values of R and so the probability that C = mix2 L (R, B) is at most 2/2 s . The proof of the fourth part is symmetric.
We point out that the properties of circular rotations combined with xors as utilized in mix2 have been used before in different settings, such as [23] .
We have introduced two mixing functions for the following reason: mix1 is conceptually more elegant, while mix2 is operationally more elegant. In addition, mix2 is in effect an approximation of mix1, making the latter an important conceptual building block. Such mixing functions might prove useful in future provable-security results.
Note that our definition of an (s)-good mixing function is general, but XLS requires a mixing function for which S ⊇ ∪
i . This is clearly the case for mix1 and mix2. For the rest of the paper when we refer to an (s)-good mixing function, we implicitly require that this function is well-defined for such an S.
The Bit Flips
In steps 05 and 07 of XLS (see Figure 1) we flip a single bit. Flipping bits in this manner is unintuitive and might seem unimportant for the security of XLS. However, the bit flips are actually crucial for the security of the scheme when in the VIL setting. Let E † be the cipher defined by running the algorithm of Figure 1 except with lines 05 and 07 omitted. Then the following VIL adversary A easily distinguishes E † from a family of random permutations. The adversary A makes two enciphering queries on M = 0 n+1 and M = 0 n+2 , getting return values C and C respectively. If the first n bits of C and C are equal, then A outputs 1 (the oracles are likely the construction) and otherwise outputs 0 (the oracles are likely a random permutation). We have
. This is so because for both queries the inputs to E are necessarily the same (as one can verify quickly by following along in the diagram in Figure 1 ; remember to omit the flip steps). Clearly Pr[π
and so A has large advantage.
Security of XLS
We are now ready to prove the security of XLS. The proof is broken into two parts: first we show that XLS is secure in an information-theoretic setting (i.e., using actual random permutations as components). Afterwards we pass to a complexity-theoretic setting to get our main result.
Theorem 2 Fix n and an
≥n Then for any adversary A that asks at mostueries we have that Adv
, and so, by Lemma 1,
for mix = mix1 and mix = mix2, respectively.
Proof: We first present a self-contained chunk of the proof, and sketch the intuition of how to prove the other portion. The full proof of the latter is deferred to Section 7. Fix n and let mix: S 2 → S 2 be an (s)-good mixing permutation. Let E: Perm(M) × M → M be a cipher with message space M and let E: Perm(n) × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a blockcipher. Note that these last two simply implement a family of random length-preserving permutations on M and a random permutation on {0, 1} n , respectively. Let A be a ±prf adversary against E * = XLS[mix, E, E]. We therefore must bound
Recall that we disallow A from making pointless queries. We utilize a game-playing argument [5] and the first two games are G0 and G1, shown in Figure 3 .
In G0 we build E and E lazily using the appropriate Choose procedures, and so E and E are partial functions in this context. Note that DE, RE, DE, RE are initially empty and the functions E, D, E, D are everywhere undefined. As usual, D and D represent the inverses of E and E. While game G0, which includes the boxed statements, enforces that E and E be length-preserving permutations, game G1 dispenses with that requirement (the boxed statements are not included in G1). A flag bad is initially false and set to true when, in the course of building E and E, a duplicate
Let s be smallest number s.t. {0, 1}
Let s be smallest number s.t. {0, 1} domain or range point is initially selected. In G0 these points are not used (enforcing that the functions are permutations), but in G1 we use them and thus duplicate points can be added to DE, RE, DE, and RE. A collision is just a pair of equal strings in one of the sets. Note that for DE and RE, only strings of the same length can collide.
Game G0 exactly simulates E * and its inverse while G1 always returns random bits. This second statement needs to be justified for the case of a query M / ∈ M (or C / ∈ M). Particularly, if the j th query is to encipher M j / ∈ M, then the last s bits returned are
∈ M. We can therefore replace the oracles A queries with the two described games and apply the fundamental lemma of game playing [5] to get
The following lemma captures the bound on the ability of A to set bad.
Combining Lemma 2 with Equation 1 implies the theorem statement, and a full proof of the lemma is deferred to Section 7. Here we informally sketch one of the more interesting cases for proving the lemma above. In particular, we reason about the probability that A can set bad by causing a collision in the set DE, which represents the domain of E. Note that in the full proof we go through several game transitions before reasoning about this case-here we do it in the context of game G1 and thus end up being a bit informal. For simplicity we'll just focus on enciphering queries. Suppose that the i th and j th (with i < j) enciphering queries result in applying E to the same domain point. That is, if we let X i and X j be the bit strings added to DE during queries i and j, then a collision in DE occurs if X i = X j and l ≡ |X i | = |X j |. If such a collision occurs with high probability, then A would be able to distinguish easily. There are two main cases to consider, based on the lengths of the queried messages M i and M j . The cases are marked by triangles.
Suppose that |M i | / ∈ M and |M j | / ∈ M. The two domain points are
We break down the analysis into two subcases:
are selected uniformly and independently from any random choices made during query i. We have then that flip1(M j 4 ) consists of n − s j randomly selected bits, which will collide with the appropriate n − s j bits of X i with probability 2 −n+s . Furthermore,
is a string of s j random bits. We can apply the definition of an (s)-good mixing function to get that the probability that M j 6 collides with some other value is at most (s). Combining the two probabilities, we see that the probability that . In turn this means that M i = M j , which would make query j pointless. But since we disallow A from making pointless queries, we have a contradiction. Second consider, without loss of generality, that s i < s j . Then we have that X i can not equal X j (recall that |X i | = |X j | = l) because flip1 ensures that X i l − s j = X j l − s j . Thus, in either situation, the probability of a collision is zero. Now suppose that |M i | ∈ M and |M j | / ∈ M. The two domain points are M i and X j = M ) we can apply the definition of a good mixing function. This gives that the probability of M j 6 colliding with the appropriate s j bits of M i is at most (s). Therefore the probability that M i = X j is at most (s)/2 n−s .
If on the other hand |M i | / ∈ M while |M j | ∈ M, then we can only apply similar reasoning if we show that A learns nothing about certain random choices made in the course of answering query i. We do just that rigorously in the full proof.
So in the cases above the probability of a collision is no greater than (s)/2 n−s , where s ∈ [1 .. n−1]. Because each query adds one string to DE, we have that |DE| = q. Thus, the total probability of bad being set due to a collision in the domain of E is at most
Combining this (via a union bound) with analyses of the other ways in which bad can be set yields a sketch of the lemma.
The next theorem captures the security of XLS in a complexity-theoretic setting. It's proof is by a standard hybrid argument, which utilizes as one step Theorem 2. when mix = mix1, and the same expression, but with the 9 replaced by 14, when mix = mix2. Here B runs in time t B = t + cµq log q and asks q B =ueries, each of length at most µ, and C runs in time t C ≤ t + (q + 1) · Time E (µ) + cµq and asks q C ≤ 2q queries, each of length at most n.
Proof: Fix a blocklength n and an (s)-good mixing function mix:
n be a blockcipher and E: K E × M → M be an enciphering scheme for message space M.
Let A be a ±prp adversary attacking E * = XLS[mix, E, E] running in at most time t and makingueries each of which is of length no more than µ. We use a hybrid argument consisting of five distinct settings. Imagine randomly instantiating the oracles F and G that A has access to with a random instance of one of the following pairs:
Let p i be the probability that A returns 1 when given the i th pair of oracles above. Also, let p ij ≡ p i − p j . We therefore have that p 15 = Adv ±prp E * (A). Further,
We can bound p 15 by bounding each of these terms:
Consider an adversary C with access to oracles f, g that behaves as follows. Adversary C begins by choosing a random L from K E . Then it runs adversary A. When A makes a query F (X), adversary C answers this query by executing the algorithm specified by XLS[mix, E, f ] on input X: running E with the chosen key L and utilizing its oracle f where appropriate. When A makes a query G(Y ), adversary C similarly answers this query by executing the algorithm specified by XLS[mix, D, g]. Adversary C returns whatever is returned by A. Adversary C runs in time t ≤ t + (q + 1) · Time E (l) + cµq where c is an absolute constant. Adversary C asks q ≤ 2q oracle queries. The advantage of C is Adv ±prp E (C) = p 12 .
• p 23 ≤ Adv ±prp E (B). We consider an adversary B with oracles f, g that behaves as follows. Adversary B will lazily grow a random permutation π in the conventional way. It runs A and answers any query F (X) by running the algorithm specified by XLS[mix, f, π]. Similarly, when A queries G(Y ), adversary B answers the query by running the algorithm specified by XLS[mix, g, π −1 ] Adversary B returns whatever A returns. It runs in time t = t + cµq log q where c is an absolute constant and B asks q oracle queries. (The log q factor accommodates the sampling of the random permutation in the worst-case time.) The advantage of B is Adv ±prp E (B) = p 23 .
• p 34 ≤ (5q 2 (s)/2 n−s ) + (3q 2 /2 n ). Theorem 2 gives us this result.
• p 45 ≤ 0.5 q(q − 1)/2 n ≤ q 2 /2 n . This is standard; see for example the proof of Lemma 6 in [15] .
Combining the different portions of the hybrid argument we get that
which proves Theorem 3.
Proof of Lemma 2
We want to bound the probability that A forces bad to be set in game G1 (refer to Figure 3) . We proceed through a sequence of game transitions, and then conduct a case analysis of the probability of setting bad in the final game.
procedure Finalize bad ← (a collision occurs in DE or in RE or in DE or in RE) In this game the setting of bad is deferred to the Finalize procedure, and the sets DE, RE, DE, RE record information about strings that would have been defined for the range and domain of E and E in Game G1.
(Game G2; Fig. 4 ) We modify game G1 in several ways to create game G2. We dispense with the Choose procedures. Instead, we directly sample uniformly where appropriate, and we add to the sets DE, RE, DE, RE tuples that record information about the bit strings that would have been added to the domain and range of E and E in game G1. Each tuple added to these sets is of the form (j, L, S) where j ∈ [1 .. q] is the query responsible for adding the tuple; L ∈ {EM 2 , DM 2 , EC 45 , DC 45 } (for tuples in DE), L ∈ {EC 2 , DC 45 , EM 45 , DM 2 } (for tuples in RE), L ∈ {EM, DM, EM 146 , DM 146 } (for tuples in DE), or L ∈ {EC, DC, EC 146 , DC 146 } (for tuples in RE) is a label representing where in the game the tuple was added -we distinguish between enciphering and deciphering queries by the 'E' and 'D'; and finally S is the bit string actually being added to the domain or range of E or E. Note that all tuples in each of the sets are distinct. Finally, we defer the setting of the flag bad until after all the queries have been handled.
We define a collision to be any pair of tuples (i, L, S) and (j, L , S ) for which S = S and both tuples are in one of DE, RE, DE, or RE. Anytime bad would have been set in G1 we have that a tuple is added to one of the sets that collides with a tuple already in the set. Additionally, every query still returns a sequence of random bits. Therefore Pr A G1 sets bad = Pr A G2 sets bad
The rest of the proof is dedicated to showing that collisions in these sets can only occur with low probability regardless of the adversary's choices. We go ahead and bound the probability of some types of collisions occurring in game G2, and wait to reason about the others in a later game. Particularly, we first focus on trivial collisions. A trivial collision is a pair of tuples
where i < j and S = S . Trivial collisions correspond to a collision between a previously added bit string and a fresh, uniformly chosen bit string By fresh we mean that the adversary has received no information about the random choice (which is clear in these cases since the random choice occurs in the later of the two queries).
The following claim bounds the probability that A causes a trivial collision.
Proof: We first show that the probability of any category of trivial collision is low, and then count the total number of potential trivial collisions in each set to prove the claim. For categories (1), (2), (5), and (6) the probability of a collision is clearly at most 2 −n because S is always freshly chosen at random and |S | ≥ n. For category (3) we have that S = flip1(C
is a uniform string of n − s bits and
where C j 6 is a uniform s-bit string. We apply the definition of a good mixing permutation to get that the probability of C j 5 equaling the corresponding portion of S is at most (s). Thus the probability of S equaling S is at most (s)/2 n−s . For category (4) a symmetric argument gives us the same bound.
Since |DE| ≤ 2q |RE| ≤ 2q, and |DE| ≤ q and |RE| ≤ q and using the union bound we have
Now we define non-trivial collisions, which encompass all other possible collisions in the game. Formally, a non-trivial collision is between a pair of tuples
where i < j and S = S . Since trivial and non-trivial collisions represent all the ways in which bad can be set we have that Pr A G2 sets bad ≤ Pr A G2 causes trivial collision + Pr A G2 causes non-trivial collision
(Game G3; Fig. 5 ) We modify game G2 to form game G3, which only sets bad in response to non-trivial collisions. We also change the order of many random choices. A query is immediately responded with by random bits. During the finalization phase G3 revisits each query and determines the values of each internal variable. To do so, G3 must compute C 
bad ← (a nontrivial collision occurs in DE or in RE or in DE or in RE) mixing permutation, in particular because mix R (·, B) is a permutation for any appropriate value B. We use the inverse of mix R (·, B), which we write as mix 
(Game G4; Fig. 6 ) In the last game, G4, we move to a non-interactive setting in which the adversary specifies a transcript τ = (M, C, ty) where
. . , C q }, and ty = {ty 1 , ty 2 , . . . , ty q }. (Recall that A is not allowed to specify pointless queries.) Otherwise, the game G4 is identical to the finalization portion of game G3. From now on we assume that A utilizes a fixed transcript τ that maximizes the probability of the flag bad being set. Thus
Pr A G3 sets bad ≤ Pr A G4 sets bad .
Now we bound the probability of bad being set in G4 using a union bound and bounds on the probability of nontrivial collisions occurring in each of the sets DE, RE, DE, RE:
procedure Finalize
bad ← (a nontrivial collision occurs in DE or in RE or in DE or in RE) We handle each term by a separate claim. In proving the following claims we use the fact that the adversary A has no knowledge of the random choices made in game G4 -they are all made after the transcript has been specified.
where L is necessarily either EC 45 or DC 45 (L can not be EM 2 or DM 2 because the structure of the game would not allow the second tuple to then be added.) We handle each case in turn, marking the arguments for each with a triangle.
Let (i, EC 45 , S) and (j,
4! is uniformly selected from {0, 1} n−s and (as we show in a moment) C i 5 is uniformly selected from {0, 1} s . Thus, the probability that S = M j 2 is at most 1/2 n . Now to show that C i 5 is uniform.
3 )) In the right hand side of these equivalences, we have that M i 5 is uniformly chosen, and thus by Definition 1 part 2 (mix R (·, B) is a permutation) the output of
which is a string of n random bits. The probability that S = M j 2 is therefore 1/2 n . Since there are at most q tuples (i, L, S) with L ∈ {EC 45 , DC 45 } and at most q tuples of the form (j, EM 2 , M j 2 ), the total probability of a nontrivial collision in DE is at most q 2 /2 n .
∈ RE where necessarily L ∈ {EM 45 , DM 45 } (as in the previous claim, the game would not allow the tuples to both be added to RE if L = {EC 2 , DC 2 }).
Let (i, EM 45 , S) and (j, DC 2 , C j 2 ) be tuples in RE. Then S = M i 4 || M i 5 which is a string of n random bits and equals C j 2 with probability at most 1/2 n . Let (i, DM 45 , S) and (j, DC 2 , C j 2 ) be tuples in RE and let
4! is uniformly selected from {0, 1} n−s and (as we justify in a moment) M i 5 is uniformly selected from {0, 1}
s . The probability that S = C j 2 is therefore at most 1/2 n . Now to show that
) . In the right hand side of these equivalences, we have that C i 5 is uniformly chosen, and thus by Definition 1 part 2 (mix R (·, B) is a permutation) the output of
is a permutation). Since there are at most q tuples (i, L, S) with L ∈ {EM 45 , DM 45 } and at most q tuples of the form (j, DC 2 , C j 2 ), the total probability of a nontrivial collision in RE is at most q 2 /2 n .
Proof: A nontrivial collision in DE can occur between two tuples (i, L, S) and (j, L , S ) where L ∈ {EM, DM, EM 146 , DM 146 } and L ∈ {EM, EM 146 }. There are actually only six cases to consider, since if L = EM, a collision with L ∈ {EM, DM} would actually imply a pointless query. We now look at the six cases in turn.
Let (i, EM, M i ) and (j, EM 146 , S ) be in DE and let s = |M ) is at most (s j ) as given by Definition 1 part 3. The probabilities are independent and so a collision in this situation happens with probability no greater than (s j )/2 n−s j .
• Now consider when M . In turn this means that M i = M j , which would make query j pointless and therefore we have a contradiction and this can not occur. Second, without loss of generality, assume s i < s j . Then we note that S can not equal S because flip1 ensures that S |M i | − s i − s j − 1 = S |M j | − 2s j − 1 .
So the probability of a collision between these types of tuples is at most (s j )/2 n−s j . Let (i, DM 146 , S) and (j, EM 146 , S ) be in DE. Let s j = |M , respectively. Thus the probability that S = S is at most (s j )/2 n−s j , where we apply Definition 1 part 3 in the usual way.
Let (i, EM 146 , S) and (j, EM, M j ) be in DE. The probability that S = M j is at most (s)/2 n−s for s = |M j |. the usual application of Definition 1 part 3.
Let (i, DM 146 , S) and (j, EM, M j ) be in DE. Let s = |M i 3 |. We have that
where M i 4! is uniformly selected from {0, 1} n−s and M i 6 = mix
5 is uniformly selected from {0, 1} s . By Definition 1 parts 1 and 2, we have that M i 6 is also distributed uniformly over {0, 1}
s . Thus the probability of S = S is at most 1/2 n .
In all cases the probability of a collision is at most (s)/2 n−s where s ∈ [1 .. n − 1] (necessarily (s)/2 n−s ≥ 1/2 n , for any s). As |DE| = q the probability of a collision in DE is at most −n which completes our proof of Lemma 2.
Supporting Tweaks
A tweakable cipher [15, 16] is a function E: K E × T × M → M where K E = ∅ is the key space, T = ∅ is the tweak space, and M is the message space. We require that E T K (·) is a length-preserving permutation for all K ∈ K E and T ∈ T . We write the inverse of E as D. A tweakable blockcipher is a tweakable cipher with M = {0, 1} n for some fixed n. Tweakable ciphers are useful tools for building higher-level protocols. The tweak of a cipher can be used as, for example, a sector index.
The security of a tweakable cipher is based on indistinguishability of the scheme and a tweakable random permutation. More formally, we define the following advantages
